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Employee insolvency priorities and employment protection in France, Germany and the 
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When an employer becomes insolvent, employees’ claims for unpaid wages and contributions may be protected 
through either statutory priorities, or social security schemes, or a combination of both strategies. This paper 
compares the interplay of employee statutory priorities, if existing, and social security schemes in France, Germany 
and the United Kingdom. While France protects employees through both a statutory priority and a social security 
scheme, Germany and the U.K. have progressively reduced employment protection over the last forty years. It will 
be shown that the theories of varieties of capitalism and of legal origins cannot fully describe and explain the 
development of employment protection strategies in most of these countries. The evolution of German and U.K.’s 
regimes, in particular, are better explained as a sign of profound cultural shifts regarding the position of labour 
within firms and vis-à-vis other stakeholders. Finally, this paper also takes a stance with the concept of ‘functional 
equivalence’ in comparative law, by showing that a cumulative application of employee priorities and insurance 
schemes is not necessarily redundant. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A standard principle of all insolvency regimes is that secured creditors take priority over other 
creditors and unsecured creditors are treated equally. In several jurisdictions, however, specific 
categories of unsecured claims, notably employees’ claims for unpaid wages and contributions, 
are entitled to preferential treatment. Several comparative works have classified employee 
priorities around the world1 and have addressed the complex issue of creditor statutory priorities2, 
but only few of them have assessed the institutional environment in which these priorities are 
embedded. 3  Employees, indeed, may also be protected through social security schemes 
established for compensating due wages and contributions that the insolvent employer has not 
paid. Thus, to understand how employees are protected against this risk, it is necessary analysing 
the interplay between employee priorities (if existing) and social security schemes across different 
jurisdictions, looking for common patterns or divergences. A common explanation for diverging 
combinations of institutional strategies across jurisdictions is the idea that such divergences are 
closely linked with specific national production regimes or with historical legal background. 
Within this conceptual framework, the theory of ‘varieties of capitalisms’ and the ‘legal origins 
hypothesis’ have gained a particular relevance: the former classifies all countries along the 
distinction between ‘liberal’ and ‘coordinated market economies’, while the latter argues that 
capital market developments depend on whether the legal origin of each jurisdiction is rooted in 
common law or civil law.4  
This paper will critically compare the interplay between employee priorities (if existing) and 
social security schemes in three Member States of the European Union: France, Germany and 
the United Kingdom5. These jurisdictions are representative of different ‘varieties of capitalism’ 
and ‘legal origins’: while the United Kingdom is a model of ‘liberal market economies’, and 
England is the birthplace of all common law jurisdictions, Germany and France are typical 
                                                        
1 
W. Huaiyu, ‘An international comparison of insolvency laws’ (2006) OECD 5th forum on Asian Insolvency 
Reform, 27-28 April 2006, <http://www.oecd.org/china/38182541.pdf> (comparing insolvency regimes in 42 
countries); G. W. Johnson, ‘Insolvency and social protection: employee entitlements in the event of employer 
insolvency’ (2006) OECD 5th Forum on Asian Insolvency Reform, 
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/38184691.pdf>; J. Sarra, ‘Recognizing workers; 
economic contributions: the treatment of employee and pension claims during company insolvency: a comparative 
study of 62 jurisdictions’ (2008) <http://iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/finish/572/5379.html> (who 
compared 62 jurisdictions); P. M. Secunda, ‘An Analysis Of The Treatment Of Employee Pension And Wage 
Claims In Insolvency And Under Guarantee Schemes In OECD Countries: Comparative Law Lessons For Detroit 
And The United States’ (2014) 41 Fordham Urban Law Journal, 867. 
2 See the works of J. M. Garrido: ‘The distributional question in insolvency: comparative aspects’ (1995) 4 
International Insolvency Review, 25; Preferenza e proporzionalità nella tutela del credito (1998); ‘No two snowflakes the same: 
The distributional question in international bankruptcies’ (2011) 46 Texas International Law Journal 459. See also: J. L. 
Westbrook, ‘Universal Priorities’ (1998) 33 Texas International Law Journal 27; J. A. Pottow, ‘Greed and pride in 
international bankruptcy: the problems of and proposed solutions to local interests’ (2006) 10 Michigan Law Rev. 
1899; A. Piekenbrock, ‘Insolvenzprivilegien im deutschen, ausländischen und europäischen Recht’ (2009) 122 
Zeitschrift für Zivilprozessrecht 63; P. Omar, ‘The challenge of diverse priority rules in European insolvency laws’ (2011) 
Eurofenix, Autumn, 32; J. L. Westbrook, C. D. Booth, C. G. Paulus and H. Rajak, A Global View of Business Insolvency 
Systems (2010) 184 – 195. 
3 See the studies of Johnson and Secunda, op. cit., n. 1. 
4 See the seminal paper of R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. W. Vishny, ‘Legal determinants of 
external finance’ (1997) 52 The Journal of Finance 1131.  
5 For simplicity, this study will refer to English law and to the English insolvency regime, codified by the 
Insolvency Act 1986, which applies in England, Wales and, with few exceptions, Scotland. In Northern Ireland, 
however, insolvencies are regulated by the The Insolvency (Northern Ireland) Order 1989, which entails rules that 
are in line with those of the Insolvency Act 1986. Therefore, all arguments discussed in this study are to be extended 
to all countries of the United Kingdom. 
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‘coordinated market economies’ and models for civil law systems around the world.6 Comparing 
the strategies of these three countries for protecting employees from the risk that an insolvent 
employer does not pay due wages, therefore, casts light on the use of the theory of ‘varieties of 
capitalisms’ and the ‘legal origins’ hypothesis in comparative company and insolvency law. 
Interestingly, this perspective also challenges the separation between private law, dealing only 
with inter-private conflicts, as opposed to public law, dealing with top-down regulations and 
redistribution mechanisms. Although creditors’ priorities are private law instruments, they also 
serve a social function, which could also be fulfilled by typical public law strategies, such as social 
security schemes. This question may be alternatively formulated by asking whether employee 
priorities and social security schemes are functional equivalents.  
The paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the ‘varieties of capitalism’ theory 
and the legal origin hypothesis. The third section addresses the main goals of insolvency 
proceedings and illustrates the reasons why many insolvency regimes deviate from the principle 
of equal treatment of creditors. The fourth section compares French, German and English 
regimes; it will be shown that in the last 40 years England and Germany have developed in the 
same direction – namely reducing or repealing employee priorities – while the French regime of 
employment protection has remained unaltered. An historical analysis, therefore, reveals a 
complex scenario, that does not fully reflect the fracture between ‘liberal’ and ‘coordinated’ 
market economies, and between common law and civil law countries. The last section tries to 
make sense of this complex scenario; first of all, it will be shown that the tendency to replace 
employee priorities through social security schemes reveals a conceptual and cultural shift as to 
the position of labour in the business; finally, it will be argued that that employee priorities and 
social security mechanisms are not mere functional equivalents, with the consequence that their 
cumulative application is not always redundant. 
 
SETTING THE SCENE: VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM, LEGAL ORIGINS AND CREDITOR PROTECTION 
Two theories on the interplay of different institutional settings in different jurisdictions have 
gained prominence in the most recent scholarly researches on comparative company and 
insolvency law and have triggered a quite intense and still on-going debate: the ‘varieties of 
capitalism’ approach, and the ‘legal origin’ hypothesis.  
The ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach, rather than a single theory, is a bundle of theories having 
some common elements. According to its first conceptualization, national political economies 
can be segmented into five institutional spheres: industrial relations, vocational training, 
corporate governance, inter-firm relations and worker- management relations. 7  National 
equilibriums among these spheres are clustered into two ideal-types of economies: ‘liberal market 
economies’ and ‘coordinated market economies’. In the former, firms and other social actors 
coordinate their relations mostly by way of competitive market arrangements and market 
transactions. By contrast, in coordinated market economies, firms and other social actors also 
rely upon non-market relationships and top-down regulation.  
The interplay and the combinations between different institutional settings are commonly 
characterised by reference to the concept of ‘complementarity’ between institutions. The starting 
point is that in each national economy, different institutional settings normally provide coherent 
                                                        
6 
P. A. Hall and D. Soskice, ‘Introduction to varieties of capitalism’, in Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional 
Foundations of Comparative Advantage, eds. Hall and Soskice (2001). 
7 P. A. Hall and D. Soskice, op. cit., n. 6. 
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incentives, reinforcing each other’s efficiency and returns. 8  Institutions are considered 
complementary to each other when the presence of one institution reinforces the efficiency and 
the returns of other institutions (‘complementarity as reinforcement’).9 In Germany, for example, 
companies rely on long-term investments and require employers to enter into firm-specific 
engagement, which corresponds to higher job stability and employment protection. 10  A 
consequence may be that different institutional settings, in order to work efficiently, should be 
coherent and should aim at attaining the same goals, while contradictory incentives and non-
coherent institutions risk being inefficient.11  
This approach has triggered an intense debate. Indeed, within the same country, different 
institutional settings could be combined in several, sometimes apparently inconsistent, manners. 
Therefore, other scholars have argued that the concept of institutional complementarity should 
also explain institutional combinations and developments in the absence of a system designer 
that exclusively pursues abstract concepts of efficiency. 12  Institutions, in particular, could 
‘mutually compensate for each other’s deficiencies’, instead of pursuing identical goals. 13 This is 
the case when the tendency of an institution offsets the outcomes of other institutions or other 
social mechanisms (‘complementarity as compensation’).  
The legal origin hypothesis, by contrast, is a coherent theory, according to which financial 
development and investor protection largely depend on whether a country’s legal origin is 
common law or civil law.14 The first papers that tested the legal origin hypothesis argued that 
common law countries (England and all derivative legal systems, including the U.S.) are better 
equipped for protecting creditors and outside investors, and that this origin explains their greater 
financial development in comparison to ‘civil law’ systems, in particular French-derived 
jurisdictions.15 According to this view, the main reason of this difference is that common law’ 
countries have a higher judicial flexibility and that they better protect property rights. In one of 
their latest contributions, La Porta et al. expanded the concept of legal origin, by adopting a 
broad conception of legal origin as a ‘style of social control of economic life’, according to which 
‘common law stands for the strategy of social control that seeks to support private markets 
outcomes, whereas civil law seeks to replace such outcomes with state-desired allocations’.16 
Interestingly, such expanded concept of legal origin perfectly fits into the distinction between 
liberal and coordinated market economies. Along this line of thought, it has been argued that a 
correlation exists between variety of capitalism and legal origin, since most liberal market 
economies have a common law origin, whereas most civil law jurisdictions are coordinated 
market economies.17 The legal origins hypothesis was also applied to classify labour relations.18 
                                                        
8 Hall and Soskice, op. cit., n. 6, pp. 19 – 22; P. A. Hall and D. W. Gingerich, ‘Varieties of capitalism and 
institutional complementarities in the political economy: an empirical analysis’ (2009) 39 British Journal of Political 
Studies, 449. 
9 Hall and Soskice, op. cit., n. 6, p. 7; B. Amable, The Diversity of Modern Capitalism (2003). 
10 Hall and Soskice, op. cit., n. 6, p. 6. 
11 Hall and Gingerich, op. cit., n. 8. 
12 W. Streeck, ‘Requirements for a useful concept of complementarity’ (2005) 3 Socio-Economic Review, at 363. 
13 C. Crouch, Capitalist Diversity and Change (2005) 50 and ‘Welfare state regimes and industrial relations systems: 
the questionable role of path dependency theory’, in Comparing welfare capitalism, eds. Ebbinghaus and Manow (2014) 
105. 
14 This classification is just one of the possible classifications of legal systems developed by comparative legal 
scholars; for an overview see: M. Siems, Comparative law (2014) 74 – 80. 
15 See in particular: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, op. cit., n. 4, p. 1131; La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, ‘Law and finance’ (1998) 106 Journal for Political Economy 1113. 
16 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, ‘The economic consequences of legal origins’ (2008) 46 Journal of 
Economic Literature 285, at 286. 
17 K. Pistor, ‘Legal Ground Rules in Coordinated and Liberal Market Economies’, in Corporate Governance in 
Context: Corporations, States, and Markets in Europe, Japan, and the US, eds. Hopt, Wymeersch, Kanda, Baum (2005) 249. 
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Botero et al., in particular, selected three main areas of states’ regulatory intervention 
(employment laws, collective relation rules and social security) and coded the rules included in 
these areas. The conclusion of this study was that common law countries protect employees less 
than civil law countries, and that a higher protection is associated with certain inefficiencies, such 
as higher unemployment and larger unofficial economy.19 Their work, however, does not include 
employment protection through insolvency priorities.  
Several scholars, however, have raised methodological objections to the legal origin hypothesis. 
One of the main criticisms is that in La Porta et al. study, variables representing laws and law 
systems are time-invariant and the analysis is simply cross-sectional.20 Therefore, this approach 
does not take into account historical developments and cannot exclude reverse-causality. 21 
Furthermore, in the legal origin model the legal dimension is an entirely exogenous phenomenon, 
while in reality the law is, at least in part, endogenous to economic development and political and 
social dynamics.22 Some authors also maintain that the legal origin approach suffers from two 
other substantial flaws under a comparative viewpoint. First of all, legal families are depicted in 
an oversimplified fashion, which is biased in favour of common law countries.23 Secondly, the 
descriptions of the institutional settings within each country, and within each legal family, do not 
take into account that in different countries functional substitutes could be in place aiming at 
attaining similar goals.24 With the aim of addressing these problems, other scholars have recently 
constructed a new comparative scale considering a wider range of variables related to creditor 
protection mechanisms (hereinafter: the ‘CBR Index’).25 The CBR Index, differently from the 
comparative scale developed by La Porta et al., in order to capture a more realistic picture of 
creditor protection strategies also considers other variables, including mechanisms for protecting 
unsecured creditors.26 
                                                                                                                                                                            
18 J. C. Botero, S. Djankov, R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Shleifer, ‘The regulation of labor’ (2004) The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1339. For an overview see: Z. Adams and S. Deakin, ‘Quantitative labour law’, in New 
frontiers in empirical labour law research eds. Ludlow and Blackham (2015) 31 – 50. 
19 Botero et al. op. cit., n. 18, p. 1378. 
20 J. Armour, S. Deakin, V. Mollica and M. Siems, ‘Law and financial development: what we are learning from 
time-series evidence?’ (2009) Brigham Young University Law Review 1435. 
21 See, for instance: J. C. Coffe Jr, ‘The rise of dispersed ownership: the roles of law and the State in the 
separation of ownership and control’ (2001) 111 Yale Law Journal 1; Armour, Deakin, Mollica and Siems, ‘How do 
legal rules evolve? Evidence from a cross-country comparison of shareholder, creditor, and worker protection’ 
(2009) 59 American Journal of Comparative Law 579, at 586. 
22Armour, Deakin, Mollica and Siems op. cit., n. 20 p. 1450; J. Buchanan, D. H. Chai and S. Deakin, ‘Empirical 
analysis of legal institutions and institutional change: multiple methods approaches and theory application to 
corporate governance research’ (2014) 10 Journal of Institutional Economics 1, at 12. 
23 P. Lele and M. Siems, ‘Shareholder protection: a leximetric approach’ (2007) 7 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 17. 
24 B. Ahlering and S. Deakin, ‘Labor regulation, corporate governance and legal origin: a case of institutional 
complementarity?’ (2007) 41 Law and Society Review 865; Deakin, Lele and Siems, ‘The evolution of labour law: 
calibrating and comparing regulatory regimes’ (2007) 146 International Labour Review, 133 at 136 – 141. 
25 Armour, Lele, Mollica and Siems, ‘CBR Creditor Protection Index for the UK, the US, Germany, France, and 
India’ (2006) Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge. This index has been recently extended to 
cover 30 countries for a period stretching between 1990 and 2013: see the whole updated dataset 
<www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/256566>.  
26 See: S. Deakin and P. Sarkat, ‘Does creditor protection matter? Legal and financial development in four 
OECD countries, 1970 / 2005’, working paper on <www.ssrn.com/abstract=2613879> and Deakin, Mollica and 
Sarkar, ‘Varieties of creditor protection: insolvency law reform and credit expansion in developed market economies’ 
(2016) 14 Socio-Economic Review 1. The same authors have also coded labour protection in France, Germany, the U.K., 
India and the U.S. (<http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/research-projects/completed-projects/law-finance-
development/>). Additionally, see also Armour, Deakin and Siems, CBR Leximetric Datasets. 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.17863/CAM.506>, coding labour law of 117 countries. 
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Despite this significant difference, the index developed by La Porta et al. and the CBR Index 
share a similar approach regarding the variable measuring creditor protection, since a country 
receives a score of 1 when secured lenders are prioritised over any other creditors and when they 
can enforce their rights outside the procedure, whereas countries where statutory priorities are in 
place, or where a statutory stay applies to secured creditors, receive a lower score.27 In other 
words, these specific variables only measure the priority system and the protection of secured 
creditors, not the protection of any kinds of creditors, and seem to move from the implicit 
assumption that secured creditors’ absolute priority is per se a desirable policy goal.28 In this 
regard, the most common argument supporting secured creditors’ protection is that it avoids 
debtors’ moral hazard, reduces the overall cost of credit and increases the willingness to lend. 29 It 
is worth stressing, however, that the rationale for secured creditors’ absolute priority is debated 
and still puzzling. Several scholars, indeed, argue that secured credit absolute priority only 
redistributes value from non-sophisticated and involuntary creditors to sophisticated creditors30, 
and that efficiency gains are not, or not always, ascertainable.31  
It is now clear why, and to what extent, the ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach and the ‘legal origin’ 
hypothesis are significant for comparative legal researches and for understanding employee 
priorities. These theories, indeed, make possible a comparison of the interplay among complex 
and interdependent institutional settings pursuing similar goals. Regarding employee priorities, 
which alter ex post free-market bargains between a debtor and its creditors, both theories would 
predict that in ‘liberal market economies’ (and common law countries) no employee priorities 
should exist, and that ‘coordinated market economies’ (and civil law countries) should be more 
open to statutory priorities shaping the balance among stakeholders.  
 
                                                        
27 See: La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, op. cit., n. 15 p. 1135; Armour, Lele, Mollica and Siems, 
‘CBR Creditor Protection Index for the UK, the US, Germany, France, and India’ (2006) Centre for Business 
Research, University of Cambridge.  
28 It is necessary remembering that a difference exists between the La Porta index and the CBR Index, as we 
have seen above: while the former is exclusively based upon this variable measuring secured creditor protection, the 
latter also measures, through other variables, the level of protection of unsecured creditors and is, consequently, 
more balanced and accurate. 
29 T. H. Jackson and A. T. Kronman, ‘Secured financing and priorities among creditors’ (1979) 88 Yale Law 
Journal, 1143; G. McCormack ‘Reforming the law of security interests: national and international perspectives’ (2003) 
Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 1 at 5; J. Armour, ‘The law and economics debate about secured lending: lessons for 
European law making?’ in The future of secured lending in Europe, eds. Eidenmüller – Kieninger, European Company and 
Financial Law Review, Special Volume 2 (2008) 3. See also the empirical works of: S. A. Davydenko and J. R. Franks, 
‘Do bankruptcy codes matter? A study of defaults in France, Germany, and the U.K.’ (2008) 63 Journal Of Finance 
565 and R. Haselmann, K. Pistor and V. Vig, ‘How law affects lending’ (2010) 23 Review of Financial Studies, 549 
(positive correlation between rules on collateral and lending, while bankruptcy variables – including the variable 
‘secured creditors first’ – have a lower relevance). The same philosophy is followed by the ‘doing business’ report 
developed by the World Bank: <http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/getting-credit#close> 
30  Non-sophisticated and involuntary creditors are commonly labelled ‘non-adjusting creditors’, while 
sophisticated creditors are defined ‘adjusting creditors’, since they can ‘adjust’ their market and contractual 
conditions. See: L. A. Bebchuk and J. M. Fried, ‘The uneasy case for the priority of secured claims in bankruptcy’ 
(1996) 105 Yale Law Journal 857, at 885 – 887 and T. Guzman, ‘International Bankruptcy: In Defense of 
Universalism’ (1999 – 2000) 98 Mich. L. Rev 2177. 
31 See: A. Schwartz, ‘Security interests and bankruptcy priorities: a review of current theories’ (1981) 10 Journal of 
Legal Studies 1; L. Lo Pucki, ‘The unsecured creditor’s bargain’ (1994) 80 Virginia Law Review, 1886; Bebchuk and 
Fried, op. cit., n. 30. 
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THE MYTH OF INSOLVENCY LAW NEUTRALITY 
1. Creditors’ equal treatment versus statutory priorities 
One of the main goals of insolvency proceedings is addressing collective action problems faced 
by creditors when their debtors become insolvent. First of all, in order to prevent creditors from 
individually seizing their debtors’ assets, a widespread strategy is providing a general stay of 
individual creditors’ claims. Secondly, in order to avoid the risk that creditors reject a 
restructuring plans hoping to be paid in full if the plan succeeds (hold-out problem), rules on 
restructuring proceedings require that rescue plans are binding for all creditors when they are 
approved by a majority of creditors. According to a widespread view, insolvency rules should 
exclusively aim at facilitating the efficient liquidation of a debtor’s assets or the most value-
enhancing restructuring plan, to the advantage of all creditors, without altering pre-insolvency 
entitlements deriving from private bargains, such as pledges, mortgages and other guarantees.32 It 
goes without saying that, in this conceptual framework, assets’ distribution should follow the 
principle of par condicio creditorum, or pari passu, according to which secured creditors rank in 
priority to unsecured creditors and all unsecured creditors rank equally. 
As a matter of facts, however, insolvency regimes are never neutral for the distribution of a 
debtor’s estate to creditors and other stakeholders. Without a statutory stay of creditors’ claims, 
for instance, creditors would seize the debtor’s estate on a ‘first come – first served basis’, which 
would replicate a Hobbesian state of nature, where men are wolves for other men and the 
strongest prevails.33 In the business world, the most sophisticated and best-informed creditors 
would prevail over the less sophisticated, and probably less affluent, creditors. A statutory stay, 
however, respects pre-insolvency creditors’ entitlements, such as privately negotiated guarantees. 
By contrast, statutory priorities any other rules altering pre-insolvency entitlements have a more 
pronounced distributive impact.34 In this regard, it is worth remembering that rules on creditors’ 
ranking and priorities vary greatly from country to country, reflecting political options for the 
preferred equilibrium between classes of creditors35, as well as domestic legal concepts, so that 
any classification is likely to be incomplete.36 Priorities, for instance, may be shaped in the form 
of privileges over proceedings deriving from the sale of specific debtor assets; such privileges 
could be characterised either as rights in rem, such as liens in common law jurisdictions, or as 
statutory alterations of creditors’ ranking with regard to certain assets.37 Regardless of specific 
national classifications and rules, what matters for the purposes of this study is classifying 
statutory priorities according to their impact on other creditors’ claims; we should, therefore, 
distinguish between: (a) statutory priorities that treat certain unsecured creditors preferentially to 
other unsecured creditors, while secured creditors take a higher priority to all unsecured creditors 
(hereinafter: ‘simple priorities’); (b) statutory priorities that treat certain unsecured creditors 
preferentially to all other creditors’ claims, including secured claims (hereinafter: ‘super-
priorities’).  
                                                        
32 T. H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law (1986) 21 – 25. 
33 T. Hobbes, De Cive (1642); 1st English edition: Philosophicall rudiments concerning government and society (1651); see 
the Dedicatory Epistle to the Earle of Devonshire at 1: ‘To speak impartially, both sayings are very true; That Man 
to Man is a kind of God; and that Man to Man is an arrant Wolfe’. 
34 Garrido, op. cit. (1995), n. 2, p. 31. Priorities follow local values and policy options, but do not necessarily 
protect local creditors only, as foreign creditors can also make use of these priorities: Pottow op. cit., n. 2, p. 1911. 
35 F. M. Mucciarelli, ‘Not just efficiency: insolvency law in the EU and its political dimension’ (2013) 14 European 
Business Organization Law Review 175.   
36 Garrido, op. cit. (1995), n. 2. 
37 With regard to systems deriving from the French code civil, see: Garrido, op. cit. (1995), n. 2; for Germany see 
Piekenbrock, op. cit., n. 2, pp. 87 – 93 and C. Paulus, ‘The Wonderful Wolrd of Privileges – The Par Condicio 
Creditorum vs. Closeout-Netting’ (2014) European Company and Financial Law Review 531.  
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Both simple priorities and super-priorities alter, albeit to different extents, the economic relations 
among creditors to the advantage of the preferred claims. Since an insolvent debtor’s estate is 
likely to be not sufficient for satisfying all creditors’ claims, statutory priorities, in practice, 
transfer value from other creditors to the prioritised class of creditors. While simple priorities 
just shift the economic burden of a debtor’s insolvency from one class of unsecured creditors to 
another38 , super-priorities also disregard privately negotiated guarantees to the advantage of 
certain categories of creditors. It is interesting to note that such rules produce redistributive 
effects among social actors by simply altering privately negotiated entitlements between a debtor 
and his or her stakeholders, instead of through tax-paid mechanisms. Needless to say that 
statutory priorities create tensions between prioritised and non-prioritised creditors. In this 
regard, we can borrow the words of the Cork Report, claiming that priorities should be ‘justified 
by reference to principles of fairness and equity which would be likely to command general 
public acceptance.’39  
 
2. Strategies for protecting employees  
When a firm enters into insolvent liquidation, employees lose the financial resources aimed at 
supporting them and their families, unless social security mechanisms exist that sufficiently 
support their needs until they find another job. Employees are in a particularly vulnerable 
position since their investment is firm-specific and undiversified.40 Employers, therefore, could 
exploit their position and behave opportunistically at workers’ expense. Additionally, when the 
insolvent employer is a company, limited liability protects shareholders’ private assets from 
creditors’ claims, including employees’ claims. Limited liability, therefore, exacerbates the risk of 
employers’ opportunism41 and, indeed, not paying due wages and contributions in the vicinity of 
insolvency should certainly be added to the list of such opportunistic behaviours. Bearing this in 
mind, it is clear that employee priorities related to due wages and contributions are strategies for 
addressing the risk that employers use their insolvency as a shield for avoiding labour obligations. 
                                                        
38 Garrido, op. cit. (1998), n. 2, pp. 32 – 36.  
39 Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (‘Cork Report’), Cmnd. 8558 (1982), at 
1398. 
40 See: H. Hansmann, ‘When does worker ownership work? ESOPs, law firms, codetermination, and economic 
democracy’ (1990) 99 Yale Law Journal, 1749, at 1764 – 1765; O. Williamson, The economic institutions of capitalism (1985) 
250 – 262; Hansmann, The ownership of enterprise (1996) 26: ‘with time it may become increasingly costly, both 
professionally and personally, [for a worker] to change employers’, with the consequence that ‘her present employer 
is in a position to act opportunistically toward her in setting wages or other terms of employment, compensating her 
only well enough to prevent her from leaving and thereby, in effect, appropriating the value of the job-specific 
investments, both professional and personal, that she has made’; Williamson, ‘The theory of the firm as governance 
structure: from choice to contract’ (2002) 16 Journal of Economic Perspectives, 171, at 185: ‘workers who acquire firm-
specific skills will lose value if prematurely terminated (and firms will incur added training costs if such employees 
quit)’ and the risk of moral hazards on the employers’ side ‘will result in demands by workers for a hazard premium, 
and recurrent contractual impasses, by reason of conflict, will result in inefficiency’; Roy Goode, Principles of corporate 
insolvency law (2011) 235 – 240. 
41 E. Tucker, ‘Shareholder and director liability for unpaid workers’ wages in Canada: from condition of granting 
limited liability to exceptional remedy’ (2008) 26 Law and History Review 58. In general, on the role of limited liability: 
Bebchuk and Fried, op. cit., n. 30, p. 899; J. Armour, G. Hertig and H. Kanda, ‘Transactions with creditors, in The 
anatomy of corporate law, eds. Kraakman, Armour, Davies, Enriques, Hansmann, Hertig, Hopt, Kanda (2009 2nd edn) 
116 – 117; S. Blankenburg, D. Plesch and F. Wilkinson, ‘Limited liability and the modern corporation in theory and 
in practice’ (2010) 34 Cambridge Journal of Economics 821, at 831. 
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In continental Europe, employee priorities were probably firstly introduced by a reform of 
Tuscany insolvency law in 171342, but the most famous version was in the French Civil Code of 
1804, which codified previous French customary law that was aimed at protecting domestic 
workers.43 In an era when a fully-fledged social security was not developed, employee priority 
was mainly justified as a form of workers’ social protection. During the 20th Century, the 
International Labour Organisation codified the necessity of having such priorities in place. In 
1949 the ILO convention on protection of wages stated that ‘in the event of the bankruptcy or 
judicial liquidation of an undertaking, the workers employed therein shall be treated as privileged 
creditors either as regards wages due to them for service rendered during such a period prior to 
the bankruptcy or judicial liquidation as may be prescribed by national laws or regulations, or as 
regards wages up to a prescribed amount as may be determined by national laws or regulations.’44 
Each state should establish the ‘relative priority’ of those claims in relation to other creditors, 
giving regard to specific domestic circumstances and, obviously, to domestic welfare state 
infrastructures. This convention was adopted in an era where progressive and ‘Keynesian’ ideas 
were functional to post-world war II reconstruction and were, therefore, shared values at 
international level.  
In 1992, however, the same organisation approved a further convention on labour protection45, 
which watered down the original provisions. Indeed, according to the new convention, workers’ 
claims should be paid before other unsecured creditors, while secured creditors are not 
mentioned46 ; furthermore, employee priority could be reduced or abolished ‘where workers’ 
claims are protected by a guarantee institution’.47 This innovation was the signal that the cultural 
and economic climate was changing – or had already changed – and that the interests of 
sophisticated secured lenders had gained relevance in the policy discourse. Indeed, a few years 
later, the Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights System, issued in 2001 by 
the World Bank, gave more weight to the interests of business and bank and to the aim of 
protecting secured lenders. The Principles, in particular, stressed that ‘[a]ny priority placed ahead 
of the secured party represents a substantial cost, which is generally transferred back to 
borrowers in the form of higher interest rates and transaction costs. Often the public policy 
represented by the priority (say, benefiting workers) receives a minor and occasional benefit at a 
substantial cost to the entire commercial system. Such priorities should be eliminated, reduced, 
and, where public policy concerns are compelling, addressed by other legal reforms that do not 
compromise the system for secured lending’.48 In other words, only if pressed by ‘compelling 
political concerns’ to protect workers, politicians should intervene preferably by not altering pre-
existing entitlements deriving from private bargains between a debtor and his or her creditors. 
                                                        
42 Riforma degli Statuti di Mercanzia, issued motu proprio by the Grand Duke of Tuscany Cosimo 3d on April 11th 
1713; see: Garrido, op. cit. (1998), n. 2, p. 22, footnote 51.  
43 French Civil Code (Code Civil des Français), original version issued on March 21st 1804 (usually called ‘Code 
Napoleon’), article 2101 and article 2104. See Garrido, op. cit. (1998), n. 2, p. 35, and A. Bronstein, ‘The protection of 
workers’ claims in the event of the insolvency of their employer’ (1987) 126 International Labour Review 715, at 718 – 
720. 
44 Protection of Wages Convention, 1949 (No. 95) adopted 1st July 1949, entered into force 24th September 1952, 
article 11. 
45 Protection of Workers’ Claims (Employer’s Insolvency) Convention, 1992 (No. 173) – adopted 23 June 1992, 
entered into force 8th June 1995. 
46 Protection of Workers’ Claims (Employer’s Insolvency) Convention, 1992, article 5. 
47 Protection of Workers’ Claims (Employer’s Insolvency) Convention, 1992, article 8. 
48 World Bank Principles 2001, paragraph 58. See also paragraph 147: ‘There is an observable tendency to 
increase the categories of debts enjoying such priority, for example by giving this status to each new form of tax or 
duty or each additional employee entitlement. Indeed, in countries with a strong tradition of worker protection there 
is sometimes an acute tension between the provision of safeguards for employees against the consequences of their 
employers’ insolvency and the need of the bankruptcy trustee to keep the business viable and, if possible, restore it 
to profitability, which may involve a sharp reduction in the workforce.’ 
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This strategy clearly advantages sophisticated creditors, such as banks or large corporations, 
which have sufficient market power to require guarantees from their debtors. In a similar vein, 
the UNCITRAL legislative guide to cross border insolvencies, issued in 2004, emphasized that 
‘[s]ome priorities are based on social concerns that may be addressed more readily by law other 
than the insolvency law, such as social welfare legislation, than by designing an insolvency law to 
achieve social objectives that are only indirectly related to questions of debt and insolvency. 
Providing a priority in the insolvency law may at best afford an incomplete and inadequate 
remedy for the social problem, while at the same time rendering insolvency proceedings less 
effective’. 49  The idea behind this suggestion is that employee priorities and social security 
schemes are like communicating vessels, so that if a social security scheme is sufficiently broad, 
employees can recover the full amount of due wages and contributions and priorities are not 
necessary or less important. 
In the European Union, a preference for social security mechanisms can probably be read 
between the lines of the Directive on Employees’ Protection50, according to which Member 
States should put in place mechanisms that guarantee the payment of employees’ outstanding 
claims relating to their employment, by establishing a ‘guarantee institution’ for securing 
‘payment of employees’ outstanding claims resulting from contracts of employment or 
employment relationships’.51 Member States can exclude certain employees’ claims from social 
guarantee’s protection ‘by virtue of the existence of other forms of guarantee if it established that 
these offer […] a degree of protection equivalent to that resulting from this directive’.52 What is 
extremely interesting is that the Directive requires a factual and empirical comparison on 
whether a certain institutional setting is as effective as the mandatory ‘guarantee institution’. The 
English regime is a telling example for alternative protections. The National Insurance Fund, 
protects employees’ claims for due wages, with the exception of seamen’s claims that are only 
covered by maritime lien. This is a guarantee created by operation of law over a ship and its 
cargo53, granting seamen a priority over other creditors. The question arises as to whether these 
two strategies (social security v. statutory priority) produce equivalent effects for employees. In 
this regard, the European Commission stressed that this lien ‘may not always offer a degree of 
protection equivalent to that of the National Insurance Fund’.54  Implicitly, the Commission 
argues that employee priorities are not as effective as social security schemes, and that Member 
States cannot replace the guarantee institution foreseen by the Directive on Employees’ 
Protection through insolvency priorities. It is worth mentioning, however, that the Insolvency 
Regulation Recast of 2015 clearly stresses that different employee priorities across Member 
States are to be respected and that the next review of the regulation should identify further 
measures in order to ‘improve preferential rights of employees at European level’.55 
 
                                                        
49 UNCITRAL legislative guide 2004, section V, paragraph 68. 
50 Council Directive 80/987/EEC on the approximation of the laws of Member States relating to the protection 
of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer [1980] OJ L 283/23. This directive was amended 
several times and eventually codified by Directive 2008/94 of the European Parliament and the Council [2008] L 
283/36 (Directive on Employees’ Protection). 
51 Directive on Employees’ Protection, article 1(1). 
52 Directive on Employees’ Protection, article 1(2). 
53 International Convention on Maritime Liens and Mortgages, 1993, articles 4 and 5.  
54  Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation and 
application of certain provisions of Directive 2008/94/EC on the protection of employees in the event of the 
insolvency of their employer, 28.2.2011, COM (2011) 84 Final, 3. 
55 Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council, on insolvency proceedings (recast) 
[2005] L141/19, recital 22.  
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EMPLOYEE STATUTORY PRIORITIES IN FRANCE, GERMANY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 
In the next section, employee priorities and social security mechanisms in France, Germany and 
the United Kingdom will be compared and contrasted. These countries share a common element, 
namely the implementation of the Directive on Employees’ Protection. Nevertheless, rules on 
employees’ ranking and social security schemes are combined in different ways, according to 
own domestic political and economic agenda.  
 
1. France 
According to the French regime, when an employer enters into an insolvency proceeding, all 
claims deriving from labour contracts are protected by a super-priority that curbs secured 
creditors’ claims.56 Employees’ super-priority has a broad scope, as it protects any employees’ 
claims against their employers, including claims for paid leave. Such priority is capped at a 
monthly threshold of twice the amount used to calculate social and pension contributions, which 
can be increased and updated through a government regulation.57 Since the monthly amount for 
calculating social pensions in 2015 was €3,170,58 the statutory floor for employees’ super-priority 
was €6,340. Employees’ claims exceeding the monthly amount of the super-priority are entitled 
to a forth-rank privilèges généraux (a ‘general privilege’) on movable assets59 and a second-rank 
general privilege on immovable assets60 of their insolvent debtor. It is worth remembering that in 
France, like in other southern-European countries61, creditors’ priorities have proliferated over 
recent decades and, in some cases, they have probably reached a saturation point beyond which 
preference creditors are scarcely protected or not protected at all.62  By introducing a super-
priority, therefore, the French legislator tried to effectively protect employees, since simple 
priorities are likely not to be effective.  
Besides these priorities, employees are also protected through an insurance mechanism based 
upon employers’ contributions.63 In particular, all employers should insure the payment of all due 
salaries, including pension and insurance payments. This insurance mechanism is implemented 
through a special entity, created for that specific purpose by the national employer organisations, 
in agreement with the labour minister. 64  The insurance fund protects any contracts of 
employment, including part-time contracts, fixed-term and temporary contracts, and guarantees 
any due payment without time limitation, up to a maximum amount which is updated every year 
(in 2015 the amount was €76,080). When this insurance fund indemnifies employees, it is 
subrogated to employees’ rights and is, therefore, entitled to super-priority vis-à-vis other creditors. 
The statutory priority, therefore, is a crucial element of this complex mechanism for protecting 
employees, for it allows the insurance fund (and indirectly its contributors: the employers as a 
                                                        
56Code de commerce, article L625-7 (originally in article 128 of the Loi 85-98 25 January 1985 on the redressement et à 
la liquidation judiciaires des entreprises and was transferred in article L6211-130 of the Code de commerce by the Loi 94-475, 
10 June 1994, art. 92) referring to Code du Travail, article L143-10; this rule was originally introduced by Décret 73-
1046, 15th November 1973 and since 2008 is embodied in Code du travail, article L3253-2. 
57 Code du travail, article L3253-2. 
58 Ministre des affaires sociales, de la santé et des droits des femmes - ministre de l'agriculture, de 
l'agroalimentaire et de la forêt - secrétaire d'Etat chargé du budget: Arrêté du 26 novembre 2014 portant fixation du 
plafond de la sécurité sociale pour 2015. 
59 Code civil, article 2331. 
60 Code civil, article 2375 (formerly in article 2104). 
61 Garrido, op. cit. (1995), n. 2, pp. 39 – 40. 
62 Garrido, op. cit. (1995), n. 2, p. 36. 
63 This insurance mechanism was also created in 1973: Loi 73/1194, as amended. See now Code de travail, article 
L143-11-1. 
64 Code de travail, article L143-11-4 (Association pour la Gestion du régime d'assurance des créances des Salaires). 
 
This is the version of the article accepted for publication in the Journal of Law and Society that will be published by Wiley: 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-6478/issues 
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23221/  
class) to recover what it paid for protecting employees’ claims. The ultimate burden of this 
mechanism is hence placed upon other unsecured creditors’ shoulders. 
 
2. Germany 
Germany has a reputation for strong social security mechanisms and worker protections, and is 
considered a typical example of coordinated market economies. Bearing this in mind, we can 
predict that German employees should be entitled to both a statutory priority for claims related 
to due wages and a strong social security, similarly to France. Nevertheless, the German 
Insolvency Act 1994, which entered into force in 1999 65 , abolished all creditor priorities, 
including priorities protecting employee claims for due wages, with the sole exceptions of a 
limited list of statutory liens 66  and few other cases. 67  The lack of employee priority is 
compensated by a social fund collectively financed by German employers.68 The policy goal of 
the German insolvency regime is to canalise employees’ protections into just one strategy that 
socialises costs among the employers as a class. This social fund covers outstanding employees’ 
claims related to a period of three months prior to the decision to open an insolvency 
proceeding, including wages, holiday pay, bonuses and pension contributions (Insolvenzgeld). This 
fund protects any employees with outstanding pay claims, including part-time employees, 
employees with fixed-term or temporary contracts, regardless of whether they are also protected 
by statutory unemployment schemes. In 2004, the maximum amount of Insolvenzgeld was capped 
at the level of the monthly unemployment scheme payment.69 After a payment, the social fund is 
subrogated to employees’ position vis-à-vis the employer. Therefore, the social fund does not 
enjoy any priorities and can only partially recover what it paid to employees. 
A retrospective analysis, however, reveals that former insolvency rules of West Germany 
(Konkursordnung)70 were amended in 1974 to introduce employee super-priority, similarly to the 
French regime. In particular, employees’ claims for due wages over six months before their 
employers’ insolvency ranked in priority to other creditors’ claims, including secured creditors.71 
In the same year, the West German Parliament introduced the guarantee mechanism protecting 
employee’s claims for due wages.72 German employees’ protection, therefore, followed the same 
path of France, just one year apart. In 1994, however, the Parliament of unified Germany, by 
reforming the insolvency law73, repealed all insolvency priorities, including employees’ priority 
for due wages. This decision granted the pari passu principle to its full extent. 74  Another 
consequence is that the liquidator can avoid any payments made a short time before filing for 
insolvency, including employees’ wages paid within three months prior to the opening of the 
                                                        
65 Insolvenzordnung (InsO), 5.10.1994, BGBl. I 2866, as amended.  
66 A. Piekenbrock, op. cit., n. 2, p. 63. 
67 In particular, set-off rights and rules on clos-out netting operate, in practice, as priorities or privileges; see: C. 
Paulus, op. cit., n. 37, pp. 531 – 553. 
68 Sozialgesetzbuch III 1997, §165. 
69 Sozialgesetzbuch, 3d book [1997] BGBl, I/594, §167. 
70 Konkursordnung, Deutsches Reichsgesetzblatt [1879] Nr. 10, 351 – 389. See: Piekenbrock op. cit., n. 2, p. 84. 
71 Konkursordnung § 59(1) No 3-a, § 60(1), and §61(1) No 1-a, introduced by the act 17th July 1974, BGBl I, 1481, 
article 2 §1 No 1-b.  
72 Arbeitsförderungsgesetz (AFG) [1969] BGBl. I/582, § 141a, as amended in 1974. The AFG was repealed in 1997 
through the Sozialgesetzbuch, 3d book. 
73 Insolvenzordnung (InsO) [1994] BGBl I/2866, entered into force on 1st January 1999. 
74 The only exception is related to employee contracts signed by the provisional administrator: InsO §55(2). For 
an overview see: M. Balz, ‘Market conformity of insolvency proceedings: policy issues of the German insolvency law’ 
(1997) 23 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 167. 
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insolvency proceeding are avoidable, if the employees were aware of the insolvency. 75  The 
official motivations for the Insolvency Act maintain that any creditor priorities are ultimately 
based upon arbitrary political decisions and, therefore, that these priorities are not logically 
justified.76 The 1994 reform also increased the likelihood of rescue proceedings, while under 
previous Konkursordnung an insolvent debtor’ liquidation was the most likely outcome of 
insolvency.77 
This issue was, however, intensively debated and the question arose as to whether this strategy 
would have harmed workers facing their employer’s insolvency. In 1992, while debating the 
reform proposal, the main opposition party (SPD) agreed to repeal other creditor priorities, with 
the sole exception of employee priorities.78 Two years later, however, the SPD accepted the idea 
of also repealing employee priorities, arguing that ‘in practice, in at least ¾ of cases such 
priorities are only on paper and in the residual ¼ of cases these priorities are effective only in 
few cases’, and that other social security strategies, such as the Insolvenzausfallgeld, ‘and other rules’ 
(perhaps referring to the whole social security mechanisms) provide better protection for 
employees.79 Similarly, the official motivations for the Insolvency Act argued that the Insolvenzgeld 
was a sufficient protection for workers. The problem, however, was – and still is – that the 
Insolvenzgeld only covers the payment of the last three months of due wages, while the former 
super-priority protected due wages of the last six months before insolvency. Nevertheless, the 
official motivation for the Insolvency Act argued that this gap of three months was of scarce 
practical relevance, without further explaining why this was the case.80  
 
3. United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, creditor priorities are almost unknown, and insolvency rules respect 
pre-insolvency entitlements and private bargains between a debtor and its creditors. In this 
regard, it is worth remembering that in 2002 the Crown preference for unpaid taxes was also 
abolished.81 The only exception is employees’ preferential treatment regarding claims for due 
wages and contributions. Employees’ claims, in particular, rank higher in priority than other 
unsecured creditors, while fixed secured creditors and insolvency practitioners’ fees are 
prioritised over any other unsecured creditors, including employees. This protection covers any 
employees’ due wages, including holiday remuneration and related rights82, for a period of four 
months prior to the starting day of the insolvency proceeding.83 This priority, however, is capped 
                                                        
75 InsO §130. 
76 German Parliament [Deutscher Bundestag], 12 legislative period, Drucksache 12/2443, 15.04.92, at 90.  
77 Balz, op. cit., n. 74. 
78 See the arguments of Mr Pick MP, German Parliament [Deutscher Bundestag] 12 legislative period, 94 Sitzung, 
3.6.1992, at 7774. 
79 Mr Pick MP, German Parliament [Deutscher Bundestag] 12 legislative period, 222 Sitzung, 21.4.1994, at 19119. 
80 German Parliament [Deutscher Bundestag], 12 legislative period, Drucksache 12/2443, 15.04.92, at 90: ‘Für die 
Arbeitnehmer sind keine sozialen Härten zu erwarten, da für die Lohnausfälle der letzten drei Monate vor der Eröffnung des 
Insolvenzverfahrens Konkursausfallgeld gezahlt werden soll; ältere Rückstände sind selten von Bedeutung’. 
81 Enterprise Act 2002 s. 251. 
82 Insolvency Act 1986, Schedule 6, Category 5. Such priority, however, dates back to the Preferential Payments 
in Bankruptcy Amendment Act 1897, s. 2. See now: Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2014 
(Commencement No 7) Order 2014, SI 2014/3160. For Northern Ireland see: The Insolvency (Northern Ireland) 
Order 1989, s. 149 and Schedule 4, Category 5. 
83 Four different ‘relevant dates’ trigger this priority, according to the specific procedure: the date on which the 
company entered administration, the date on which a voluntary arrangement takes effect, the date of the 
appointment of a provisional liquidator, or the date of the winding-up order: Insolvency Act 1986, s. 387. 
 
This is the version of the article accepted for publication in the Journal of Law and Society that will be published by Wiley: 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-6478/issues 
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/23221/  
at a maximum amount of £800, which has remained unaltered since 1976.84 In this respect, the 
Cork report of 1982, which set the conceptual framework for the Insolvency Act 1986, 
recommended an increase of this threshold, while the Trade Union Congress requested a 
complete abolition of any thresholds.85 Employees’ residual claims above this threshold rank 
equal to other unsecured claims and, although a ‘prescribed part’ of debtors’ estate should be 
made available for unsecured creditors86, the residual estate is likely not to be sufficient to satisfy 
employees’ claims. The employee preferential treatment, therefore, only marginally alters pre-
insolvency entitlements. In 1976, however, the nominal value of £800 had a much higher 
purchasing power than today. A commonly used calculator of currencies’ relative value87 shows 
that in 2015 the relative value of 1976’s £800 ranges from £4,820.00 to £11,520.00, depending 
on the purposes for which this sum is to be used. The value of the ‘historic standard of living’, 
measuring the ability to purchase a bundle of ‘basic’ goods and services, is about £5,200 today. 
This means that all political parties that were holding the government office since 1976, by not 
adjusting this nominal value to inflation, have tacitly decided to continuously shrink the 
protection of employee priority to a quite low real value. Of course, there might be several 
justifications for this lack of adjustment, one of those could be that this mechanism for 
protecting employees is relatively unimportant, or that workers are mainly concerned with future 
unemployment rather than with past losses (which may be minimal since employees are paid 
monthly). As it may be, even if we assume that the total amount of unpaid due wages is relatively 
unimportant, the decrease in value of this priority is tantamount of a creeping abolition of this 
protection. 88 
In the present scenario, where employees’ priorities have been reduced to a quite low amount, 
employees’ protection is mainly based upon social security. In this regard, the Employment 
Rights Act 1996, which codified previous legislation and implemented the Directive on 
                                                        
84 This amount was originally increased to £800 by the Insolvency Act 1976, Schedule 1, Part 1 (amending 
Section 33(1)(b) and (c) of the Insolvency Act 1914) and then, following the enactment of the Insolvency Act 1986, 
it was confirmed by the Insolvency Proceedings (Monetary Limits) Order 1986, SI 1986/1996, s. 4.  
85 Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (‘Cork Report’), Cmnd. 8558 (1982), at 
1433.  
86 Insolvency Act 1986, s. 176 . 
87 I use the online calculator developed by L. H. Officer (University of Illinois at Chicago) and S. H. Williamson 
(Miami University): < https://www.measuringworth.com/ukcompare/ >. 
88A further form of employee super-priority existed under the original version of the Transfer of Undertaking 
(Protection of Employees) Regulation 1981, SI 1981/1974 (TUPE 1981), which implemented the Business Transfer 
Directive (Council Directive 77/187/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to the 
safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings, businesses or parts of businesses, OJ 
1977 L61/26). TUPE Regulations 1981 s. 5(2) maintained that the transferee inherited all liabilities of the transferor 
vis-à-vis its employees. The House of Lord decision in the case Litster included in the scope of TUPE Regulations 
1981 any unfair dismissals that took place before a transfer of undertaking, with the consequence that the transferee 
of an insolvent undertaking inherited all labour debts and that employees were put in a privileged position as 
compared to other creditors. See: Litster v Forth Dry Dock and Engeneering Co Ltd (1989) IRLR 161. The new Transfer 
of Undertakings (Protection of Employees) Regulations 2006 clarified that the regulation only applies to insolvency 
proceedings opened for restructuring the insolvent undertaking, and ‘not with a view to the liquidation of the assets 
of the transferor.’ SI 2006/246 (TUPE 2006), regulation 8(6). This reform implemented a provision of the new 
Business Transfer Directive (see: Council Directive 2001/23/EC OJ 2001 L82/16, article 5), which however leaves 
Member States the possibility of opting-out. See: S. Deakin and G. S. Morris, Labour Law (2012, 6th ed.) 588. This 
debate is far from being peculiar of the UK regime. In France, the transferee inherits all liabilities of the transferor, 
except when the latter has entered an insolvency procedure of sauvegarde, redressement judiciaire or liquidation judiciaire: 
Code de travail, article L1224-2. In Germany, on paper the transferee should inherit all liabilities of the transferor 
without exceptions (§613a BGB), but, according to case law of the Federal Labour Court, when the transfer occurs 
after an insolvency procedure has been opened, the transferee does not inherit liabilities that arose before the filing 
for insolvency; see: Bundesarbeitsgericht, 20th June 2002, 8 AZR 459/01, in ZIP (2003) 139. 
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Employees’ Protection, offers a security scheme for protecting workers. 89  If an employer 
becomes insolvent, the National Insurance Fund, which is funded through contributions of both 
employee and employers, must pay debts owed to employees, including (if there was no unfair 
dismissal and the employer has given proper notice) arrears for a maximum of eight weeks at a 
rate of £464 a week, unused holiday pay, with a maximum of six weeks and up to a weekly limit 
of £464, and a statutory redundancy payment. The Insolvency Service protects any employment 
contracts, excluding merchant seamen (who, as we have seen above, are supposed to be 
sufficiently protected by maritime liens).90 Furthermore, this protection does not cover masters 
or members of the crew of fishing vessels when their payment is a share of profits or gross 
earnings of the vessel.91 The National Insurance Fund is subrogated to the rights of employees 
and is entitled to the same preferential status within the limit of £800 per employees.92  
Finally, in order to have a full picture of employees’ protection mechanisms, it is necessary 
considering that the risk of being held liable for fraudulent trading or for wrongful trading, and 
the risk of disqualification, could deter directors from not paying due wages and contributions to 
employees. First of all, directors could be held liable towards the company when they 
intentionally defrauded creditors (fraudulent trading)93, for instance when they deliberately pay 
only some of their company’s creditors, with the consequence that other creditors are not paid in 
full.94 Furthermore, directors risk being liable to contribute to their company’s assets, when they 
did not ‘took every step with a view to minimising the potential loss to the company’s creditors’ 
in a moment when insolvency was unavoidable (wrongful trading).95 In both cases, however, the 
liquidator should commence litigation and the insolvency assets support all costs, which makes 
such actions not frequent.96 Directors’ disqualifications, by contrast, is financed through public 
funding and prove much more effective.97 Courts, in particular, can issue a disqualification order 
for ‘unfitness’ when they are satisfied that a director’ conduct ‘makes him unfit to be concerned 
in the management of a company’.98 A typical case of ‘unfitness’ occurs when directors of a 
nearly insolvent company only pay certain classes of creditors, disregarding other creditors’ 
claims. 99  Therefore, the risk of being disqualified might prevent directors from disregarding 
employee wages and contributions when insolvency approaches. 
 
                                                        
89 Employment Rights Act 1996, s. 166 – 169. 
90 Employment Rights Act 1996, s. 199(4) and s. 199(5). 
91 Employment Rights Act 1996, s. 192(2). 
92 Employment Rights Act 1996, s. 167(3)(a). Interestingly, the Cork Report in 1982 recommended that the 
Secretary of State should not enjoy any preferential status and that he should be subrogated as an unsecured creditor, 
not as a preferred one. The reason was that ‘the priority accorded to employees in an insolvency is a social measure, 
intended to alleviate special financial hardship, and that in modern times the cost of meeting such social needs ought 
properly to be borne by the community’. 
93
 Insolvency Act 1986, S. 213.  
94 Starglade Properties Ltd v Nash [2010] EWCA 1314. 
95 Insolvency Act 1986, S. 214. 
96 P. Davies and S. Worthington, Gower and Davies’ Principles of Modern company Law (2012, 9th ed.) 236 – 237. 
97 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. 
98 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986, s. 6 
99 Sevenoaks (Stationers) Retail [1991] Ch 164; Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v McTighe [1997] B.C.C. 224; 
Official Receiver v Barnes [2001] B.C.C. 578; Official Receiver v Roger Charles Gawn [2014] Ch. WL 1219446. Ironically, in 
most of these cases, directors neglected the Inland Revenue, which did not press for payment, and prefer paying 
other creditors, including workers. 
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MAKING SENSE OF DIFFERENT EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION STRATEGIES  
1. Complementarity between employee statutory priority and insurance scheme 
The comparative analysis undertaken so far reveals that France, Germany and the U.K. provide 
for social security schemes that protect employees’ claims for due wages and contributions. Their 
strategies, by contrast, diverge significantly regarding the question whether employees also 
should be protected through insolvency priorities. France combines an employee ‘super-priority’ 
(within a high threshold) and a security scheme. This is, therefore, a case of ‘complementarity as 
reinforcement’, where two institutional settings (social security and statutory priority) aim at 
attaining the same goal and mutually reinforce each other. In Germany, employees do not enjoy 
any priorities and are only protected by a social security scheme based upon employers’ 
contributions. Therefore, the interplay between insolvency rule and social security scheme is 
clearly a case of ‘complementarity as compensation’, where the social security scheme 
compensates the lack of employee priorities.100 The English regime combines a priority and a 
social security scheme, but the employee priority is not as effective as their French counterparts: 
employees’ claims are only prioritised over unsecured claims and floating charges, and their 
priority is capped at a low amount (£800). The picture is further complicated by the fact that 
directors face the risk of a disqualification order when they treat one class of creditors 
preferentially to the disadvantage of other creditors. The interplay between insolvency rules, 
social security schemes and disqualification rules is to be classified as ‘complementarity as 
compensation’, where certain institutional settings (the social security and the disqualification 
rules) compensate other institutions’ weaknesses (employee priority).  
The historical analysis conducted hitherto has revealed a much more complex scenario. In 
particular, France’s policy has remained unaltered since its introduction in 1973. The most 
interesting developments, however, occurred in the U.K. and in Germany. In the former country, 
the nominal value of the priority has never been adjusted to inflation and currency devaluations, 
so that its real value in 1976 was roughly six times as big as it is today. Originally, therefore, the 
interplay between employee priorities and social securities was to be classified a weak version of 
‘complementarity as reinforcement’. In Germany, between 1974 and 1999 a super-priority was 
combined with a guarantee fund, and, therefore, its regime was identical to the French 
employees’ protection regime.101  
This longitudinal analysis leads to two interesting remarks. First, in the U.K. and Germany, albeit 
along different paths, the institutional complementarity between the ranking of employees’ 
claims and social security schemes has changed. As we have seen, in both regimes these 
institutional settings were originally connected in the guise of a ‘complementarity as 
reinforcement’, while at the turn of the twenty-first Century the social security schemes 
compensated deficiencies as to labour priorities. Such evolution indicates that institution building 
(such as the decision of repealing employee priority or not adjusting the nominal value of its cap) 
                                                        
100 This comparative analysis is briefly summarised in the following table: 
Country Employee priority Social security Complementarity 
France Yes (Super-priority) Yes ‘Reinforcement’ 
Germany No Yes  ‘Compensation’ 
U.K. Yes (Simple priority with low cap) Yes  ‘Compensation’ 
 
101 The institutional settings in these countries in 1976 (date of the U.K. insolvency reform) is summarised in the 
following table: 
Country Employee priority Social security Complementarity 
France Yes (Super priority) Yes ‘Reinforcement’ 
Germany Yes (Super priority) Yes  ‘Reinforcement’ 
U.K.  Yes (Simple priority with high cap)  Yes  ‘Weak reinforcement’ 
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may be independent from previous institutional complementarities, and may derive from specific 
political motivations and dynamics. 102  
The second remark is that the ‘varieties of capitalism’ theory and the ‘legal origin’ hypothesis can 
only partially explain the interplay between a priority system and social security schemes. Notably, 
today’s English and French regimes are coherent with their standard classifications, while 
Germany is not. The English regime, indeed, fits into its common classification as a ‘liberal 
market economy’ and into the ‘broad conception whereby ‘common law stands for the strategy 
of social control that seeks to support private markets outcomes’103 ; the French regime, by 
altering free-market bargains to the employees’ advantage, is coherent with its classification as 
‘coordinated market economy’ and with the core tenet of civil law countries. Germany, by 
contrast, shows a quite puzzling regime: the decision taken in 1994 of abolishing creditor 
priorities is much more coherent with the ideal-type of liberal market economies rather than with 
a coordinated market economy, since its underlying philosophy is that free-market private 
bargains should not be altered; this was a quite drastic U-turn from previous policy options and 
German political elites seem to have imported into the German system a regulatory choice 
rooted in other legal and economic environments. 104  If we turn our attention to the ‘70s, 
however, the classification of the English regime would have been much more controversial, 
while the German regime, being identical to the French one, was in line with the ideal-type of a 
coordinated market economy.  
 
2. The tendency towards labour ‘commodification’ 
Since employee priorities in France, Germany and the U.K. do not perfectly fit into the 
distinction between liberal and coordinated market economies, other explanatory tools should be 
developed in order to make sense of the interplay between employee priorities and social security 
schemes. To this aim, we can turn our attention to the fundamental relationship between labour 
and capital. In the last pages we have noted an increasing tendency to protect employees through 
insurance-based schemes, rather than through statutory priorities that alter pre-insolvency 
entitlements. This tendency is to be found in the official policy documents of the World Bank 
and the OECD over the last decades, as well as in British and German policy choices. This 
strategy maintains that there is no rational justification for altering the ranking of creditors to the 
advantage of any particular class of unsecured creditors, including employees, and that the policy 
goal of protecting employees is to be achieved without modifying free-market private bargains. 
This idea is based upon the implicit assumption that contracts between an undertaking and its 
employees are not different from contracts with other trade partners or suppliers, and that 
employees are akin to any other creditors.  
This assumption has a precise legal foundation. In the world of legal concepts, indeed, 
entrepreneurs, employees and other contractual parties equally have legal personality and, 
therefore, are placed on the same footing under a legal standpoint. The concept of legal 
                                                        
102 W. Streeck, ‘Explorations into the origins of non-liberal capitalism in Germany and Japan’ in The origin of non-
liberal capitalism, eds. Streeck and Yamamura (2001) 1. See also M. Höpner, ‘What connect industrial relations and 
corporate governance? Explaining institutional complementarity’ (2005) 3 Socio-Economic Review, 331, at 346, arguing 
for an increasing ‘shareholder orientation’ of German capitalism since the ‘90s.  
103 La Porta et al., op. cit., n. 14. 
104 On the effectivity of legal transplants of legal institutions, according to their connection to specific fragments 
of society, see G. Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New 
Differences’ (1998) 61 Modern Law Rev. 11, at 17 – 19. 
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personality paves the way for creating a market in which relation between an undertaking and its 
employees are identical to any other contractual relations with trade partners or suppliers, with 
the consequence that labour power is bought and sold like any other commodity.105 It would be 
wrong, however, to downplay the relevance of this ingenious legal construction as a mere 
ideological superstructure. Far from this, the formal equality between employers and employees, 
which derivers from the concept of legal personality, reflects the fact that in capitalist economies 
labour-power is to be treated as a commodity and labour itself becomes wage-labour. The 
concept of legal personality hides and politically neutralises the position of labour within the 
business and the intrinsic unequal position between these parties.106 In reality, however, labour 
relations are not like other relations between an undertaking and its trade partners or its suppliers, 
for the simple reason that employees are embedded in the business and in the production. 
Furthermore, the capacity to work cannot be separated from the worker as a human being, and 
‘cannot be shoved about, used indiscriminately, or even left unused, without affecting also the 
human individual who happens to be the bearer of this peculiar commodity’, with the 
consequence that the ‘commodity description of labor […] is entirely fictitious’.107 This idea is 
clearly expressed in the declaration of Philadelphia on the aims and purposes of the International 
Labour Organisation, which maintains that ‘labour is not a commodity’.108 
These arguments allow us to understand the relevance of rules on prioritisation of employees’ 
claims in insolvency proceedings. The common argument against employee priorities is that 
there is no logical justification for such preferential treatments, which are exclusively based upon 
political decisions. The implicit assumption is that there is no difference between employees’ 
claims and any other creditors or trade partners’ claims. In other words, this argument accepts as 
a reality the description of labour as a commodity, which the entrepreneur purchases like any 
other commodities; the equivalence between employees and other creditors leads to the 
conclusion that there is no logical justification for any preferential treatment. The entrepreneur is 
conceptually placed at the centre of a web of contractual relations, whereby any distinctions 
among different creditors blur and the specificity of labour in the business vanishes. A further 
consequence is that the sphere of the market and economy and the sphere of politics are 
conceptually separated and are constructed as mutually independent. 109  
By contrast, employee priorities are based on the assumption that, in reality, a profound 
difference exists between employees and other creditors of the same undertaking, and that 
labour is not like any other commodity that a company purchases from trade partners. 
Furthermore, labour priorities also bridge the conceptual divide between the ‘economic’ and the 
‘political’ sphere. Therefore, rules on employee ranking in insolvency, and on insolvency 
priorities, cast light on profound tendencies of a country’s political economy, much more than 
other statutory priorities that protect certain classes of unsecured creditors. The tendency that we 
have observed in Germany and England, although through different country-specific patterns, 
can be explained as a piece of a more general cultural shift that increasingly treats employees like 
any other creditors and labour like any other commodities that entrepreneurs purchase. This 
                                                        
105 K. Marx, Das Kapital, Volume 1 (1863) ch. 6: ‘labour-power can appear upon the market as a commodity, only 
if, and so far as, its possessor, the individual whose labour-power it is, offers it for sale, or sells it, as a commodity’ 
and that employees and employers ‘meet in the market, and deal with each other as on the basis of equal rights, with 
this difference alone, that one is buyer, the other seller; both, therefore, equal in the eyes of the law’. 
106 P. Barcellona, I soggetti e le norme (1984) 119 – 123. 
107 K. Polanyi, The great transformation: the political and economic origins of our time (2001, 1st ed. 1944) 76. See also J. F. 
Weeks, Economics of the 1% (2014) 30. 
108 ILO, 26th session, 10th May 1944, article 1(a). 
109 See: Polanyi, op. cit., n. 106, p. 74: ‘A self-regulating market demands nothing less than the institutional 
separation of society into an economic and political sphere. Such a dichotomy is, in effect, merely the restatement, 
from the point of view of society as a whole, of the existence of a self-regulating market.’ 
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tendency also reveals the increasing centrality of entrepreneurs, as compared to labour, in legal 
and economic discourse.  
 
3. Are employee priorities and security schemes functional equivalents? 
Even accepting the critical analysis put forward hitherto, a pragmatic approach may induce 
scholars and policy makers to argue that a cumulative application of employee priority and social 
security schemes (namely a combination of these strategies in the guise of ‘complementarity as 
reinforcement’) is redundant. In this regard, the question arises as to whether, and under which 
conditions, a legal institution in a given jurisdiction is to be considered a functional equivalent to 
a different legal mechanism in another jurisdiction that pursues the same goals or protect the 
same social needs.110 Along this line of thinking, employee priorities and security schemes aim at 
satisfying the same social need and, therefore, they may be considered functional equivalent or 
functional substitutes; thus, we could argue that different national insolvency regimes are 
equivalent when they protect employees in one way or another. Under a policy standpoint, a 
possible consequence is that a cumulative application of both mechanisms is considered 
redundant. This was also the implicit assumption behind the recommendation of the World 
Bank Principles of 2001 and the UNCITRAL legislative guide of 2004, which stressed that the 
most adequate strategy for protecting employees or other weak stakeholders is through social 
security or insurance schemes. 
This way of conducting a functional comparative analysis, however, does not consider how 
employee priorities and security schemes are connected to each other, and the impact of these 
connection on social actors involved in the insolvency of a company or an entrepreneur.111 In 
this regard, it is worth remembering that these rules govern the mutual relations among four 
classes of stakeholders: financial institutions (secured creditors), employees, other unsecured 
creditors and the insolvent employer. Their mutual relations also depend on how the priority 
system and the security scheme of a given jurisdiction are connected to each other. In the three 
countries considered in this study, the insurance scheme, after having paid employees’ due wages 
and contribution, has the right to be subrogated in employees’ claims on the debtor’ estate and 
enjoys the same priority.112 Such subrogation also affects the recovery rate of the insurance 
scheme. 
In France, therefore, where employees take priority over secured creditors, the security fund is 
likely to recover a significant portion of the amount paid, while unsecured creditors carry the 
main cost of employment protection. This institutional setting reflects a coalition between labour 
and employers, while unsecured creditors suffer a haircut; to a certain extent, banks and financial 
institutions are also likely to suffer a partial haircut up to the value limitation of employee super-
                                                        
110 See: K. Zweigert and R. Kötz, Comparative law (1998, 3d ed.) 37 – 41; R. Michaels, ‘The functional method of 
comparative law’ in Oxford Handbook of comparative law, eds. Reimann and Zimmermann (2006) 340. It can not be in 
the scope of this paper addressing the much debated issue of the merits and limits of a ‘functional approach’ to 
comparative law; on this debate see, with further reference Siems, op. cit., n. 14, pp. 25 – 28 and J. De Coninck, 
‘The Functional Method of Comparative Law: Quo Vadis?’ (2010) 74 RabelsZ 318.  
111 On the interplay of legal institutions and economic factors, shaping coalitions among social forces, see: R. V. 
Aguilera and G. Jackson ‘The cross-national diversity of corporate governance: dimensions and determinants’ (2003) 
28 The Academy of Management Review 447 at 459. 
112 In other countries, however, the insurance scheme subrogated in the emplyees’ rights does not receive the 
same priority of employees and is treated as a normal unsecured creditors (eg: Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland): 
Secunda, op. cit., n. 1, p. 919.  
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priority, which depresses their returns. 113  The same conclusions were valid for the German 
regime until 1999, while in today’s German system, where no priority exists, the security fund 
suffers a haircut as it is reimbursed pro rata as unsecured creditor. In England, since employee 
priority is capped at a low amount, the National Insurance Fund is also likely to recover a small 
portion of the amount paid. The institutional settings of England and Germany, therefore, seem 
to reflect a coalition between financial institutions (secured creditors) and employees.114  
This analysis reveals that different combinations of statutory priorities and insurance 
mechanisms produce different social and economic outcomes. Although insurance funds and 
statutory priorities protect the same social need, these institutional settings cannot be described 
as mere functional substitutes. When the insurance schemes is subrogated in employees’ position 
and enjoys the same right and priority on the debtor’ estate, it is not irrelevant for the overall 
balance of interests whether workers also enjoy a super-priority, a simple priority or no priority 
at all. Indeed, when employees are treated preferentially, the insurance scheme will be able to 
recover a larger amount of the employees’ claims, which will contribute to its bargaining power 
and its long-term financial viability.115 This conclusion also has a significant policy implication, 
namely that when the insurance schemes has the right to be subrogated to employees’ claims, a 
cumulative application of employee priorities and social security is not always redundant, mostly 
so when employees also take priority over secured creditors.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper comparatively describes employee priorities for due wages and contributions in three 
jurisdictions: France, England and Germany. These jurisdictions are representative of different 
production regimes or ‘varieties of capitalism’: England is the model of ‘liberal market 
economies’, whereas Germany and France are commonly classified as ‘coordinated market 
economies’. Furthermore, these jurisdictions are emblematic of common law (England) and civil 
law countries (France and Germany); according to the legal origin hypothesis, this classification 
explains different level of financial development across different countries. This paper, in 
particular, has addressed the interplay of employees’ priorities (if existing) with social security 
schemes aimed at protecting employees’ interests in these jurisdictions.  
Following the ‘variety of capitalism’ approach and the ‘legal origin’ hypothesis, we would expect 
that no priority should exist in England, whereas France and Germany should protect employees’ 
through insolvency priorities. A comparative analysis has revealed a much more complex and 
faceted scenario. In particular, the German regime, by abolishing priorities in 1999 seems to be 
more in line with an ideal-type of ‘liberal market economy’, while the English regime and the 
French regime are more coherent with their standard classifications. Furthermore, if we turn our 
attention to the situation during the Seventies we note that in England the real value of the cap 
placed to employee priority was quite high and that in Germany employees also enjoyed a super-
priority, similarly to the French system. This longitudinal picture, therefore, reveals a quite 
univocal result: that employment protection has been reduced over the last 40 years in England 
and in Germany, and is now entrusted only (or predominantly) to social security schemes.  
                                                        
113 This is one of the reasons why France ranks at a lower position in the World Bank’ ‘doing business’ report: 
<http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/france/getting-credit/> 
114 Germany, in other words, revealed its profound nature of being a ‘bank-based system’: Aguilera and Jackson, 
op. cit., n. 110, p. 447. See also the ‘doing business reports’ for Germany 
(<http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/germany/getting-credit/>) and the U.K. 
(<http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/united-kingdom/getting-credit/>) 
115 Secunda, op. cit., n. 1, p. 874. 
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At a more general level, the classification of England as a pure liberal market economy can 
explain why secured creditors’ preferential treatment has never been challenged. Nevertheless, 
this classification cannot fully explain why in the Seventies the British government decided to 
increase the cap of employee priorities to a high value, which altered their relations with other 
unsecured creditors. In the United Kingdom, therefore, different social and political forces can 
succeed in imposing their interests and views and can alter established equilibriums, although 
these forces have not managed to alter the economic and political predominance of the financial 
system, which requires secured creditors’ absolute priority to be respected. The case of Germany 
is even more complex and curious: in 1994, German political elites decided to completely abolish 
any statutory priorities, including employee priorities; the consequence being that the German 
regime of today, at least in this regard, by fully respecting pre-insolvency entitlements, is much 
more in line with the ideal-type of a ‘liberal’ market economy.  
In order to make sense of this development, we have turned our attention to the relation 
between labour and capital. When employees are not prioritised, their claims are treated like any 
other trade partners’ claims and, consequently, labour is conceived like any other commodities 
that are purchased by a company on a market. By contrast, if employees enjoy a statutory priority, 
politics treats workers differently from other creditors. Therefore, rules on employees’ ranking 
shed light on profound tendencies of a country’s political economy, which can probably only be 
explained as an element of much broader and long-term historical developments. Finally, this 
paper takes issue with the idea that employee priorities and social security schemes are functional 
equivalent. This study has shown that it is not irrelevant whether employees, besides social 
security protection, also enjoy a priority or not. These mechanisms are indeed strictly intertwined, 
because social security schemes in France, Germany and England are subrogated to employees’ 
rights and, therefore, if employees rank in priority over other creditors (in the guise of either a 
super-priority or a simple priority), the insurance fund should also be treated preferentially, 
whereas if no employee priority exists, claims of the insurance fund towards the insolvent 
employer rank equal to other unsecured claims. Employees’ priorities, therefore, reinforce the 
long-term financial viability of social security schemes, but, ironically, they also place the ultimate 
burden on other unsecured creditors’ shoulders. In a system with a super-priority, such as France 
(or Germany until 1999), the insurance scheme can recover a significant portion of the total 
amount paid, while in systems without priorities (Germany) or with a priority capped at a low 
level (England) the social security scheme suffers a haircut like any unsecured creditors. 
Therefore, a mere description of these two mechanisms – statutory priority and social security 
scheme – as functional substitute does not give proper account of their legal interconnections 
and their reciprocal embeddedness.  
 
 
